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We  study  how  creditor  rights  and culture  interact  with  one  another  to influence  corporate
dividend  payout  policy.  Where  creditor  rights  are  strong,  creditors  accept  the  status  quo,
which  are  large  dividends  in  individualist  and  small  dividends  in  collectivist  traditions,
respectively.  Culture  influences  dividend  payout  where  creditor  rights  are  weak.  In  collec-
tivist countries  where  group  cohesion  among  corporate  stakeholders  results  in  perceived
lower  agency  costs  of debt  and  equity,  creditors  place  few  if any  restrictions  on dividend
payout  given  weak  creditor  rights.  In contrast,  in  individualist  traditions,  creditors  continue
to restrict  dividend  payouts  under  weak  creditor  rights.  Our  findings  emphasize  the  impor-
tance of accounting  for the interactions  between  creditor  rights  and  culture  in  determining
dividend  policy.
© 2016  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
Dividend payout policy research has evolved to consider the possibility that factors’ other than firm-level characteristics,
such as the law and national culture may  influence dividend policy. Aggarwal and Goodell (2014, p. 107) suggest that “tradi-
tional finance journals are clearly quite deficient in their attention to culture and finance”. In reviewing the role that culture,
social trust, and institutions play in determining transactions costs, they assert that “all finance research should include
and reflect factors related to these softer measures in addition to traditional economic and financial factors” (Aggarwal and
Goodell, 2014, p. 106). In this paper we examine how creditor rights and culture interact with one another to influence
corporate dividend payout policy.
We draw together two strands of the dividend literature and study their interaction. The first strand, the dividend-creditor
rights literature, demonstrates that creditor rights, a formal institution, exert a sizable influence over corporate dividend
payouts. Brockman and Unlu (2009) test the La Porta et al. (2000) equity-only agency models of dividends inclusive of the
agency costs of debt and show that it is creditors and not shareholders that exert the greatest influence over corporate
dividend policy. Where creditor rights are weak, managers cater to the demands of creditors for lower dividends (the
substitution hypothesis). Where creditor and shareholders rights are strong, creditors permit large dividend payouts (see
Byrne and O’Connor, 2012; Shao et al., 2013). The second strand, the dividend-culture literature, explores the link between
culture, an informal institution, and corporate dividend payout in a purely agency cost of equity setting. Fidrmuc and Jacob
(2010) show that dividend payouts are necessary large in individualist cultures because individuals pursue the individual
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ather than the collective goal, but are much lower where a sense of collectivism prevails. In individualist traditions large
ividends compensate for the severity of the agency conflict which arises between insiders and outsiders. There is no need
or large dividend payouts in collectivist traditions because of the close links and the sense of group cohesion which is
ostered between insiders and outsiders.
The dividend-creditor rights and dividend-culture literatures are distinct from one another, a distinction highlighted by
he proponents of the dividend-culture viewpoint. They emphasize that agency conflicts are determined not only by an
bjective assessment of the severity of agency conflicts which is provided by legal rules, but also by a subjective assessment
mong individuals of the perceived extent of agency conflicts, which is captured by culture. Furthermore, measures of
reditor rights (culture) do not fully account for differences in culture (creditor rights) across countries, resulting in instances
n which the objective assessment of the extent of agency conflicts provided by legal variables may  be very different to the
ulturally determined perception of these same agency conflicts. In our sample there are countries that score lowly in terms
f creditor rights, but are polar opposites where culture is concerned (compare Japan and the United States). Also, culturally-
roximate countries can offer varying degrees of legal protection to creditors (compare Hong Kong and Thailand). Hence
ur sample exhibits sizable variation in culture and creditor rights across countries which make it possible for us to test
ow they interact with one another to influence corporate dividend policy. Thus, in this paper we  test (a) the formal agency
ost of debt and equity dividend-creditor rights relationship inclusive of culture by exploring the dividend-creditor rights
elationship in countries defined as either individualist or collective, and (b) the informal agency cost of equity dividend-
ulture relationship inclusive of the agency costs of debt, by exploring the dividend-individualism relationship in strong and
eak creditor rights regimes.
First, we explore the dividend-creditor rights relationship in individualist and collectivist traditions. To date tests of
he agency models of dividends have been conducted by including legal variables which provide an objective assessment
f the severity of the agency costs of equity and debt. These studies show that creditors demand lower dividends given
eak creditor rights, and permit the status-quo to be maintained where creditor rights are strong. Therefore, under strong
reditor rights we expect large (small) dividend payouts to remain in individualist (collectivist) traditions. The level of
ividend payouts in individualist and collectivist traditions given weak creditor rights are not as clear. Under weak creditor
ights, we hypothesize that where the relationship between corporate insiders and outsiders is harmonious in collectivist
ultures, creditors may  not demand lower dividends. In this instance, creditors perceive that the agency costs of debt are
uch lower than those suggested under the legal code, and place few if any restrictions on corporate dividend payouts.
n contrast, where both culture and the law suggest high agency costs of debt, creditors are much more likely to restrict
ividend payouts. This suggests that it is when creditor rights are weak that legal rights and culture come together to
nfluence corporate dividend policy. This line of reasoning leads to our first testable hypothesis, which is that we  expect
hat dividend payouts are sensitive to creditor rights in individualist regimes, but much less sensitive in collectivist regimes.
he positive dividend-creditor rights relation espoused by Brockman and Unlu (2009) may  occur in individualist traditions
lone. Individualism serves to moderate the dividend creditor rights relationship resulting in a weaker or even negative
ividend creditor rights relationship in collectivist traditions.
Second, the dividend-individualism literature shows that dividend payouts are largest in cultural traditions where the
erceived agency costs of equity and debt are high. Dividends are an outcome of high individualism. In this paper we test
he dividend-individualism relationship inclusive of the formal agency costs of debt by examining whether these culturally-
ooted outcome models of dividends hold under weak creditor rights? To date the dividend-individualism relationship
nder weak (or strong) creditor rights has not been examined. Under strong creditor rights we expect the positive dividend-
ndividualism relationship documented in the literature to date to be maintained. Creditors, given strong legal standing will
ccept the status-quo, which are large dividends in individualist cultures. The dividend-individualism relationship under
eak creditor rights is not clear.
To test these assertions we use measures of individualism and creditor rights and explore how they interact with one
nother to influence corporate payout policy. We  use a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries over the period from 1996 to
007. We  exploit cross-country variation in individualism and creditor rights, and in a series of pooled ordinary least squares,
ogit and Tobit regressions, we find support in favour of both of our hypotheses. The dividend-creditor rights relationship
s positive and stronger where individualism prevails. In collectivist traditions, the relationship is weaker and sometimes
egative because creditors do not demand lower dividends in collectivist regimes to compensate for weak legal standing. The
ositive dividend-individualism relationship is observed under strong creditor rights alone. Well-protected creditors consent
o high dividends in individualist countries. Under weak creditor rights, the dividend-individualism relationship is negative.
he culture-outcome model of dividends does not hold under weak creditor rights for two  reasons. First, dividend payouts
re much lower in individualist traditions because poorly protected creditors compel managers to pay lower dividends.
econd, creditors do not demand lower dividends in collectivist cultures. The net effect is that under weak creditor rights,
he dividend-individualism relationship is very often negative.
Finally, we are able to attach both statistical and economic significance to our findings. In individualist traditions, a
orst-to-best change in creditor rights results in a change in dividends paid as a percentage of cash flow of 20.5 percentage
oints i.e., 5.4%–25.9%. In collectivist societies, the same change in creditor rights results in a range of dividend payouts of just
.9% i.e. 11.3%–13.2%. In dividend-individualism regressions, where creditor rights are strong, dividends-to-cash flow ranges
rom 12.3 to 13.2% across the individualism spectrum. Under weak creditor rights, a worst-to-best change in individualism
esults in a reduction in dividends paid from 20.4 to 5.1%. All in all, our findings say that poorly-protected creditors place few
62 J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. of Multi. Fin. Manag. 39 (2017) 60–77
restrictions on dividend payout in collectivist traditions, but much larger restrictions where individualism prevails. Dividend
payouts are more sensitive to creditor rights than they are to culture, yet culture moderates the effect of weak creditor rights
on dividend payout policy.
In summary, our findings in this paper suggest that creditors influence over corporate payout policy is influenced by legal
rules and culture. When creditors rights are weak, cultural differences dictate how creditors influence dividend policy. Where
the national culture is one that lends itself to individual goals and wants, creditors will not only perceive agency conflict to
be severe, but will themselves pursue their own individual needs and exert their influence on firms to pay lower dividends.
However, where the national culture is one that is more focused on group cohesion, even poorly-protected creditors will
consider agency conflicts to be less severe and choose not to substitute their poor legal standing with lower dividends. The
cultural effect is strong enough to substitute for weak legal rights. In collectivist traditions, dividend payouts are not lower
under weak creditor rights, as creditors effectively view “strong” culture and weak legal rights as substitutes. The cultural
effect is strong enough to moderate the effect of weak creditor rights on corporate dividend payouts.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section two develops two testable hypotheses. This is followed by a discussion of the data
and the empirical design. Section four presents and discusses our findings, while section five concludes.
2.1. Theories and hypotheses development
In this section we develop testable hypothesis which address how creditor rights and culture may  interact with one
another to influence corporate dividend payout policy. We  begin by reviewing the agency cost of equity and debt inclusive
models of dividends. We  then review the dividend-culture literature where the focus is on the relationship between insiders
and shareholders. From here, we develop and state our hypotheses.
2.2. Agency cost of equity and debt models of dividends
The notion that dividends can curb agency costs of equity is not new (see for example, Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984;
Jensen, 1986; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Gomes, 2000, to name but a few). La Porta et al. (2000) formulate two  competing,
but not mutually-exclusive, agency theories of dividend payout, namely the outcome and substitution models. The equity-
only version of the outcome model predicts a positive relationship between the strength of shareholder rights, which can be
measured at the country or firm-level, and the likelihood of paying a dividend and the dividend amount.1 Shareholders can
use their legal rights to force firms to initiate a dividend in the first instance, and pay larger dividends once they ultimately
decide to do so (see Mitton, 2004; Jiraporn et al., 2011; Bartram et al., 2012; Brockman and Unlu, 2009, 2011; Byrne and
O’Connor, 2012; Shao et al., 2013, to name but a few who find support in favour of the outcome model).
The equity-only version of the substitution model says that firms can build “reputation capital” and substitute for poor
governance/disclosure standards by establishing a history of paying large dividends over time to “convince shareholders that
it will invest properly and for their benefit” (see Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013, pp. 21; Gan et al., 2013). Once trust has been
established between insiders and outsiders, these firms benefit in terms of reduced financing constraints, higher growth
rates, and higher firm value (see Gan et al., 2013). Presumably financially unconstrained well-governed firms pay lower
dividends. Hence, the substitution model predicts a negative relationship between legal rights/governance and corporate
dividend payouts. While studies to date have found mostly in favour of the outcome model, evidence has also been offered to
support the substitution model (see for example, John and Knyazeva, 2006; Officer, 2006; Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; Chae et al.,
2009). Brockman and Unlu (2011) show that the substitution model prevails in countries where disclosure environments
are opaque and the outcome model in countries where disclosure environments are transparent.
More recently, others have extended the equity-only versions of the outcome and substitution models to consider the
agency costs of debt. Brockman and Unlu (2009) contend that dividend payouts are more sensitive to country-level creditor
and not shareholder rights, suggesting that it is creditors, and not shareholders, who  exert the greater influence over corpo-
rate dividend policy. Poorly protected creditors substitute their weak legal rights with lower dividends. In other words, the
equity-only version of the outcome model of dividends inclusive of agency costs of debt may  not hold under weak creditor
rights. Shao et al. (2013) and Byrne and O’Connor (2012) show that this is in fact the case. The outcome model prevails
given strong shareholder and creditor rights only, and anomalously, the substitution model prevails under weak creditor
rights. The former finding suggests that where creditor legal standing is weak, creditors demand, and firms consent to lower
dividends. Shao et al. (2013) perform some additional tests and demonstrate that strong creditor rights do not substitute for
poor shareholder rights; dividend payouts remain low in instances where shareholder rights are weak, yet creditor rights
strong.
1 La Porta et al. (2000) find that dividend payouts are an outcome of country-level shareholder rights. Mitton (2004) concludes that corporate dividend
payouts are an outcome of effective corporate governance and country-level shareholder rights, and dividend payouts are largest where both country and
shareholder are strong. Tse (2004) questioned the logic of using large dividends to reduce agency costs in well-governed firms, since agency conflicts and
thus  agency costs are likely to be low in these firms in the first instance. Dey (2008) suggests that this is not the case, since he finds that the incidence of
agency  conflicts is more likely in well-governed firms.
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.3. Agency costs of equity models of culture and dividend payout
Recently it has been suggested that cultural differences may  help to explain why dividend policy varies substantially
cross countries. Bae et al. (2012) suggest that the lack of consensus on the determinants of dividend policy may  be due
o the failure to consider cultural differences across countries.2 The idea that culture can help explain corporate dividend
olicy rests on the notion that the underlying shared beliefs and values of individuals in a society can have an influence on
ow corporations are managed and thus shape dividend policy. Cultural explanations for dividend policy have been offered
y among others, Khambata and Liu (2006), Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010), Shao et al. (2010), and Bae et al. (2012).
Khambata and Liu (2006) use the Hofstede index to develop a measure of risk aversion (high uncertainty avoidance
nd long-term orientation implies higher risk aversion) and find that more risk averse managers will be less likely to pay
ividends, instead preferring to retain more cash in order to minimise default risk. Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) examine
he relationship between cultural differences and dividends in forty one countries and find that cultural differences do
ave significant explanatory power when explaining dividend payouts. Using the Hofstede index, they show that high
ndividualism, low power distance, and low uncertainty avoidance are significantly associated with higher dividend payouts,
ven more so after accounting for the strength of shareholder rights.
Bae et al. (2012) argue that national culture can shape a firm’s dividend strategy because people’s subjective perceptions on
he benefit of financial flexibility are contingent on the country’s culture, and in turn, financial flexibility influences dividend
olicy. They find that culture, measured by Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long term orientation are
ignificantly and negatively related to dividend levels of a firm, even after controlling for other firm and country-specific
actors. Further, they find that the association between national culture and the dividend level of a firm varies with the level
f shareholder protection. They show in cultures where agency conflicts are perceived to be more severe, dividend payouts
re even larger when shareholders are well protected. They show not only that national culture and shareholder protection
ndividually affect dividend payout policy, but also explain how national culture and corporate governance are interrelated
n influencing dividend policy. Shao et al. (2010) use Schwartz’s national culture dimensions. Focusing on the shareholder-
anagement relationship, they find that conservatism is positively and significantly related to corporate dividend payouts
hile mastery is negatively and significantly related to corporate dividend payouts.
These aforementioned papers all perform tests of the dividend-culture relationship where only the agency costs of equity
re considered. For example, the relationship between dividend payout and individualism is positive because shareholders
ccept low dividends payouts in collectivist cultures but demand large dividends in individualist cultures to compensate for
igh agency costs of equity. Shao et al. (2010) acknowledge that they have not taken the shareholder-debtholder relationship
nto consideration in their analysis and suggest this as an area that warrants further research. In this paper we do just that
y examining the relationship between individualism, creditor rights, and dividend policy. We  test (a) the equity and debt
nclusive dividend-creditor rights relationship in collectivist and individualist traditions and (b) the agency cost of equity
ultural models of dividends inclusive of the agency costs of debt by testing the dividend-individualism relationship in strong
nd weak creditor rights regimes. In the next section we  develop and state these hypotheses formally.
.4. Hypotheses
In this section we develop our hypotheses together with a description of Hofstede’s individualism measure which is the
ulture measure we employ in this paper. Hofstede defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind distinguishing
he members of one group or category of people from another”. Culture can seem to distinguish one group/society from
nother based on a certain set of values, beliefs and behaviours that are shared within a group that makes that group unique
nd distinguishable from another. The cultural index developed by Hofstede identifies five cultural dimensions, namely,
ndividualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and long-term orientation. We  use individualism to
evelop our hypotheses.
.5. Individualism, collectivism and the strength of creditor rights
In societies when individualism is high the focus is on the pursuit of individual happiness, rather than the pursuit of
he collective goal. In collectivist traditions individuals do not seek to maximize their own private benefits, but adjust their
ehaviour so that their behaviour and beliefs are in line with those of a wider group of other stakeholders, a group in which
ndividuals value membership. These alternative value systems have important implications for the perceived severity of
gency conflicts and, importantly for this study, for the potential role played by corporate dividend payouts in alleviating
uch agency concerns.
First, in countries with an individualist tradition, investors are cognisant of the fact that insiders are likely to pursue their
wn self-interests and may  engage in the consumption of private benefits. As a result, agency conflicts are expected to be
2 Cultural explanations have been offered for a wide range of financial issues such as how financial systems evolve (see Kwok and Tadesse, 2006), the
apital  structure of a firm (see Chui et al., 2002), corporate debt maturity (see Zheng et al., 2012), the corporate governance system (see Griffin et al., 2014),
nd  corporate hedging (see Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014).
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Table 1
Hypotheses relating national culture and creditor rights to payout policy.
Creditor rights
National culture Strong creditor rights Weak creditor rights Hypothesis 2
Dividend payouts are positively related to individualism where
creditor rights are strong. The relationship between dividend payout
and  individualism is ambiguous where creditor rights are weak
Collectivism Low payout ?
Individualism High payout Low payout
Hypothesis 1
Dividend payouts are positively related to the strength of creditor rights in
individualist cultural traditions. In collectivist traditions, the relationship
between creditor rights and dividend payout is ambiguoussevere, and because of this, shareholders demand large dividend payouts from firms as a consequence. Firms cater to the
desire for larger dividends since there are many reasons to suggest that doing so is also in their own  best interests (see Faccio
et al., 2001). The result is that in countries that score high in terms of individualism, dividend payouts are large (see Fidrmuc
and Jacob, 2010).
Dividend payouts are much lower in countries where collectivism prevails. Here the perception is that agency conflicts
are less severe, as in these countries insiders are much less likely to consume private benefits. Instead, insiders behave in a
manner consistent with the pursuit of an overall group goal, whereby the decisions made by corporate insiders benefit both
insiders and outsiders alike. Where collectivism prevails, shareholders are prepared to accept lower dividend payouts.
In this paper, we are interested in how individualism and creditor rights interact to influence corporate dividend payouts.
We believe that the answer lies in how creditors perceive the extent of agency conflicts within countries. The perceived extent
of agency conflicts which is shaped by culture can be in marked contrast to the level of agency costs implied by the strength of
legal rights. Hence, culture and creditor rights can complement one another (e.g. high creditor rights in collectivist countries
and low creditor rights in individualist countries), but can also substitute for one another. We  turn to a discussion of these
possibilities and the implications for the relationships between culture and dividend payout, and creditor rights and dividend
payout, respectively.
On the one hand, since insiders are much less likely to pursue their own best interests at the expense of creditors in
collectivist traditions, dividend payouts are likely to be largely insensitive to the strength of creditor rights in these countries.
Where creditor rights are strong, creditors are likely to accept the status quo, which are low dividend payouts in collectivist
traditions. Furthermore, and as demonstrated by Shao et al. (2013), creditors will not use their strong legal standing to
pressure firms to pay larger dividends, when there is no pressure from elsewhere to do so. In this paper, we  hypothesise that
strong creditor rights will not result in large dividends in collectivist traditions where low dividends are the cultural norm.
Also, we hypothesise that creditors are unlikely to affect the cultural norm in collectivist countries by demanding even lower
dividends where their legal rights are weak, because in collectivist countries the interests of large creditors are much more
likely to be protected, hence no longer necessitating the need for restricted dividends to substitute for poor creditor rights.
In summary, since creditors are likely to accept the cultural norm for low dividend payouts in collectivist countries where
creditor rights are strong, and are unlikely to demand even lower dividends given weak creditor rights, we  conclude that
the direction of the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights in collectivist traditions is ambiguous, but we
expect that the strength of the relationship is likely to be weak.
In individualist cultures we hypothesize that the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights is less ambigu-
ous. Creditors will permit large dividend payouts in individualist countries where creditor rights are strong, but not so where
their legal rights are weak. Given poor legal standing, creditors will demand lower dividend payouts in individualist tradi-
tions. An alternative view is that poorly-protected creditors may  not seek lower dividend payouts in individualist societies
because large dividend payouts serve to reduce agency conflicts in these regimes the first instance. If this is the case, we
would expect to observe that dividends are positively related to individualism across the creditor rights spectrum. While
we expect that creditors are likely to place restrictions in individualist societies given weak creditor rights, the possibility
remains that they may  not.
In summary we expect to observe the following. First, dividend-creditor rights relationship is positive in individualist
countries. Second, the dividend-individualism relationship is positive where creditor rights are strong. Third, where creditor
rights are weak, creditors are much more likely to demand lower dividends in individualist countries, than they are in
collectivist countries. However, since dividend payouts are already low in collectivist traditions, the relationship between
dividend payout and individualism is ambiguous. These arguments allow us to state our first and second testable hypotheses,
which are summarized in Table 1:
Hypothesis 1. Dividend payouts are positively related to the strength of creditor rights in individualist cultural traditions.
In collectivist traditions, the relationship between creditor rights and dividend payout is ambiguous.Hypothesis 2. Dividend payouts are positively related to individualism where creditor rights are strong. The relationship
between dividend payout and individualism is ambiguous where creditor rights are weak.
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Table  2
Construction of the sample.
Number of firms Description
36,089 Worldscope coverage of firms (active and inactive) in forty-five countries, between 1996 and 2007
−1056 Firms in mandatory dividend countries
−2789 Missing dividend data, negative dividends, sales, cash flow, earnings, assets
−5474 Financial and utility firms
−3644 Missing control variables
−5582 Firms with less than three firm-year observations
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. Data
To test our hypotheses we estimate a series of pooled ordinary least squares, logit and Tobit regressions. Our approach
iffers from previous studies in that we examine the joint effect of creditor rights and individualism on dividend policy.
o explore these issues, we source a sample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries. Table 2 summarizes the construction of
ur sample. Initially we sourced 36,089 firms from forty-five countries. We  exclude firms from countries with mandatory
ividend policies i.e., Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Greece, and Venezuela, resulting in a loss of 1056 firms. We  lose a further 2789
rms with missing or abnormal data i.e. firms with negative net income, negative total assets, and negative cash flow, and
644 firms with insufficient control variable coverage (including the country-level disclosure measure). As is common in
ividend payout studies we exclude financial and utility firms which further reduce our sample by 5474 firms, resulting
n a final sample of 17,544 firms. This sample covers the years from 1996 to 2007.3 We  source the creditor rights measure
rom Djankov et al. (2007). Creditor rights ranges from a low of zero to a high of four, with higher values suggesting strong
reditor protection. We  use creditor rights for the year 2002.4 We  employ the cultural dimension of individualism which
e source from Hofstede (1980, 2001). Individualism captures the extent of individualism (high values of this measure) and
ollectivism (low values) in a society.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for dividend payout, creditor rights and individualism. The United States (4712 firms),
apan (3333), and the United Kingdom (9702) contribute the largest number of firms, while Argentina (47), Ireland (46) and
ustria (54) provide the fewest. Sample-bias in favour of firms from the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom is
ommon in these types of studies.
We  use five dividend payout measures, namely dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, dividends-to-assets,
ividends-to-sales, and dividend payer. Dividends are total regular dividends paid to common shareholders, scaled by cash
ow, earnings, assets, or sales, as indicated. Payer equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend in year t and zero otherwise. Table 3
utlines median payer by country. Payer is the proportion of firms in each country which pay a dividend and is calculated
s follows. For each country, payer is calculated on a yearly basis from 1996 to 2007, and we  report the median payer for
ach country over this time interval.5 The amount paid in dividends varies greatly across countries. Dividend amounts are
arge in New Zealand (dividends-to-cash flow is 0.38), yet much smaller in Canada (dividends-to-cash flow is 0.05) and
he United States (dividends-to-cash flow is 0.04). Payer exhibits similar variation across countries. The median firm in the
nited States does not pay a dividend, while the proportion of dividend payers in India is 0.94.
Table 3 also reports creditor rights and individualism for each country. Creditor rights are strong in Hong Kong, New
ealand and the United Kingdom yet weak in Mexico and France. The United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom are
ndividualist societies while Thailand, Singapore and Korea are collective in nature. Crucial to our analysis is that across
ountries of equal cultural standing (creditor rights), there exists sizable differences in creditor right protection (individu-
lism). Australia and the United States score almost identically in terms of individualism, but are very different in how their
egal system protected creditor interests. Argentina, a largely collective society, and the United States, individualist, provide
he same level of creditor rights. Creditor rights are negatively correlated (unreported) with individualism, which suggest
hat with some exceptions, creditor rights are stronger in collectivist (low individualism) countries. For example, largely
ollective countries such as Hong Kong, the Netherlands and Korea (Republic) score highly in terms of creditor rights while
he U.S., which is considered individualist, does not. The exceptions are provided by among others, Australia and Mexico.
ustralia, classified as individualist, provides stringent protection for creditors. Mexico, a collectivist country, does not.
Panel B of Table 3 summarizes our five dividend payout measures. The average firm pays out just over ten percent of its
ash flow as a dividend, yet the median firm pays no dividend at all. Panel C outlines the number of firm observations by
ear. The number of observations varies across years, ranging from 5812 in 1996 to a high of 14,250 in 2005.3 In a series robustness tests which follow in Tables 7 and 8 we  show that our results are robust to increasing the sample size and extending the sample
eriod.  We discuss these issues later in the paper.
4 In a series of unreported tests we  find that our findings are unaffected when we  use creditor rights for different years.
5 This is the same approach used by DeAngelo et al. (2006) to calculate payer.
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Table 3
Sample description.
Panel A: Country-level data
Sample Dividend payout measures
# Obs # Firms Div/CF Div/E Div/Asset Div/Sales Payer Creditor rights Individualism
Argentina 324 47 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.70 1 46
Australia 4486 778 0.19 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.56 3 90
Austria 406 54 0.13 0.28 0.01 0.01 0.81 3 55
Belgium 566 81 0.12 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.79 2 75
Canada 5286 828 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 1 80
Denmark 838 101 0.12 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.85 3 74
Finland 563 88 0.23 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.87 1 63
France  3957 590 0.12 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.72 0 71
Germany 4054 595 0.11 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.59 3 67
Hong  Kong 4988 739 0.15 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.64 4 25
India  3597 510 0.16 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.94 2 48
Ireland 394 46 0.14 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.69 1 70
Italy  1259 176 0.12 0.26 0.01 0.02 0.80 2 76
Japan  24,276 3333 0.12 0.26 0.01 0.01 0.92 2 46
Korea  5031 783 0.08 0.16 0.01 0.01 0.79 3 18
Malaysia 4846 748 0.13 0.20 0.01 0.02 0.76 3 26
Mexico 713 96 0.08 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.63 0 30
Netherlands 1141 136 0.18 0.30 0.02 0.01 0.82 3 80
New  Zealand 479 72 0.32 0.48 0.04 0.03 0.85 4 79
Norway 799 120 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.62 2 69
Singapore 3223 516 0.17 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.82 3 20
Spain  795 101 0.16 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.83 2 51
Sweden 1491 239 0.17 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.61 1 71
Switzerland 1454 174 0.13 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.86 1 68
Thailand 2535 347 0.18 0.28 0.02 0.02 0.83 2 20
Turkey  920 165 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.52 2 37
United Kingdom 9702 1369 0.16 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.65 4 89
United States 36,726 4712 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 1 91
Total Average Median
124,849 17,544 0.10 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.63 2 2
Panel  B: Dividend payout data
Mean Median 5% 25% 75% 95%
Dividends-to-cash flow 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.42
Dividends-to-earnings 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.69
Dividends-to-assets 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05
Dividends-to-sales 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.05
Payer  0.48 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.94
Panel  C: Annual number of observations
Year # Obs Year # Obs Year # Obs
1996 5812 2000 9642 2004 14,178
1997  6487 2001 11,198 2005 14,250
1998  7053 2002 12,521 2006 13,637
1999  8098 2003 13,323 2007 8650
This table reports summary statistics for our sample of firms. Panel A reports summary statistics by country. # Obs is the number of firm-year observations,
and  # Firms, the number of firms in each country. Average dividend payout is reported for each country. Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow (Div/CF),
dividends-to-earnings (Div/E), dividends-to-assets (Div/Assets), and dividends-to-sales (Div/Sales), as indicated. Payer is the proportion of firms in each
country which pay a dividend. Payer is first calculated on a yearly basis from 1996 to 2007, and we report the median payer for each country over this time
interval. Creditor rights are from Djankov et al. (2007) and correspond to values in 2002. Individualism is from Hofstede (2001). Dividend payout data is
from  Worldscope. Panel B reports summary statistics for each dividend payout measure. Panel C reports the number of observations by year. The sample
period is 1996–2007.
4. Empirical findings
4.1. Univariate comparions
We  begin by presenting summary payout statistics by level of individualism and creditor rights. Consider Table 4. Here
we divide our sample of firms as follows: firms are in countries with high (low) creditor rights if their country level score for
creditor rights is equal to or greater than (less than) the (country) sample median, which is 2. Firms are in countries with high
(low) individualism, if their country level individualism score is greater than (or less than) the (country) sample median,
which is 68. This results in four distinct individualism/creditor rights regimes, namely (1) strong creditor rights/individualist,
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Table  4
Univariate comparisons and initial tests of hypotheses 1 and 2.
Test of hypothesis 1
The relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights under individualist and collectivist cultural traditions
High individualism Low individualism (collectivism)
Strong versus weak creditor rights Strong versus weak creditor rights
Strong Creditor
Rights (n = 5)
Weak Creditor
Rights (n = 8)
Difference: strong less
weak (Relationship)
Strong Creditor
Rights (n = 6)
Weak Creditor
Rights (n = 10)
Difference: strong less
weak (Relationship)
Div-Cash flow 0.13 0.09 0.04*** (Positive) 0.05 0.12 (0.07)*** (Negative)
Div-Earnings 0.22 0.19 0.03*** (Positive) 0.12 0.22 (0.10)*** (Negative)
Div-Payer 0.82 0.66 0.16*** (Positive) 0.78 0.83 (0.05)*** (Negative)
Test of hypothesis 2
The relationship between dividend payout and individualism under strong and weak creditor rights
Strong creditor rights Weak creditor rights
High versus low individualism (collectivism) High versus low individualism (collectivism)
High Individualism
(n = 5)
Low Individualism
(Collectivism) (n = 6)
Difference: high less
low (Relationship)
High Individualism
(n = 8)
Low Individualism
(n = 10)
Difference: high less
low (Relationship)
Div-Cash flow 0.13 0.05 0.08*** (Positive) 0.09 0.12 (0.03)*** (Negative)
Div-Earnings 0.22 0.12 0.10*** (Positive) 0.19 0.22 (0.03)*** (Negative)
Div-Payer 0.82 0.78 0.04*** (Positive) 0.66 0.83 (0.17)*** (Negative)
This table reports summary median payout statistics by level of culture and creditor rights. Firms are domiciled in countries with high (low) creditor
rights  (culture) if their country level score for creditor rights (culture) is equal to or greater (less than) the sample median. To calculate median payout,
we  calculate the median dividend payout for each country in each regime, and report the median of the median payouts. The median payouts for each
country are reported in Appendix A. The median values of creditor rights and individualism are based on the number of countries in the sample. Dividend
payout is dividends-to-cash flow (Div-Cash flow), dividends-to-earnings (Div-Earnings), or payer (Div-Payer), as indicated. Payer is the median proportion
of  firms in each regime which pay a dividend. Creditor rights are from Djankov et al. (2007), and culture (individualism) is from Hofstede (2001). Asterisks
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2) weak creditor rights/individualist, (3) strong creditor rights/collectivist, and (4) weak creditor rights/collectivist. There
re 5, 8, 6, and 9 countries in each of these four regimes, respectively.
Table 4 reports median dividend payouts for each regime. The median dividend payout figure reported for each regime
s the median of the individual country median payouts.6 The figures reported provide unconditional support in favour of
ur hypotheses, while also revealing the possible direction of the relationships that we earlier deemed ambiguous. In the
op rows of Table 4, we test hypothesis 1, while an initial test of hypothesis 2 is provided underneath.
First, dividend payouts are larger in individualist traditions under strong creditor rights. Using dividends-to-cash flow,
edian dividend payout is 0.13 under strong creditor rights and 0.09 under weak creditor rights. The proportion of firms
hich pay a dividend is also larger under strong creditor rights (compare 0.82 under strong creditor rights to 0.66 under
eak creditor rights). Creditors appear to restrict dividend payouts in individualist cultures where their legal rights are
eak. In contrast, we observe no such restriction in collectivist countries. Rather, where creditor rights are weak, dividend
ayouts are actually larger under weak creditor rights suggesting a negative relation between dividend payout and creditor
ights in collectivist regimes.
These summary measures provide initial support for hypothesis 1, since we observe that dividend payouts are positively
elated to creditor rights, but in individualist cultures alone. In collectivist societies the relationship between dividend payout
nd creditor rights is negative. Note that our main hypotheses do not rely on the prevalence of a negative relationship
etween dividend payout and creditor rights in collectivist countries. Rather, they rest on identifying individualism having
 moderating effect on the creditor rights dividend payout relationship in collectivist countries. Notwithstanding the usual
aveats, these simple comparisons do suggest that culture may  serve to moderate the dividend-creditor rights relationship.
The bottom rows of Table 4 also provide support in favour of hypothesis 2. Here the positive relationship between dividend
ayout and individualism, documented in the literature to date, manifests only under strong creditor rights. For example,
nder strong creditor rights, dividends-to-cash flow is 0.13 in individualist societies and 0.05 in collectivist societies. Where
reditor rights are weak, the direction of the aforementioned relationship is reversed; dividend payout is negatively related
o individualism under weak creditor rights. Under weak creditor rights, dividend payouts are larger in collectivist societies.6 Appendix A shows the median dividend payout for each country classified according to each creditor rights/culture regime. We also report an average
f  the median dividend payouts, and the median dividend payouts for each regime after excluding firms from the U.K., U.S., and Japan.
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Table 5
Dividend payout, creditor rights and culture.
Panel A
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings Payer
Creditor rights 0.014*** (11.12) 0.010*** (4.61) −0.019*** (6.92)
Individualism −0.001*** (11.25) −0.001*** (9.84) −0.002*** (11.98)
Disclosure −0.039*** (8.61) −0.060*** (9.27) −0.101*** (9.97)
Disclosure2 0.0003*** (9.20) 0.0004*** (9.53) 0.001*** (9.98)
Shareholder rights 0.010*** (4.04) 0.027*** (9.36) 0.114*** (22.89)
Size  0.014*** (29.65) 0.028*** (40.79) 0.071*** (36.65)
Growth −0.016*** (15.15) −0.021*** (14.62) −0.033*** (7.50)
Leverage −0.082*** (28.92) −0.097*** (22.33) −0.368*** (27.88)
Profitability 0.028*** (15.91) 0.022*** (9.21) 1.794*** (81.71)
Tobin’s  q 0.010*** (11.64) 0.001 (0.03) −0.074*** (32.69)
Dividend premium 0.072*** (11.81) 0.078*** (8.69) 0.044*** (3.22)
Industry and time dummies Included Included Included
#  Observations 124,849 124,849 124,849
R-Squared 0.155 0.163 0.413
Economic significance of in-sample predictions for payout ratios (%)
Creditor rights 7.3–13.0 15.1–18.5 0.51–0.37
Individualism 12.3–8.4 21.0–14.0 0.65–0.40
Economic significance of in-sample predictions using alternative payout ratios (%)
Dividends-to-assets (%) Dividends-to-sales (%)
Creditor rights 0.45–1.46 0.42–1.28
Individualism 1.16–0.53 1.17–0.43
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares and logit regressions with t-stats adjusted for clustering at the firm level
presented underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is 1996–2007. The dependent variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, or payer,
as  indicated. All country and firm-level variables are defined in the main text. A full set of year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and
***,  **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The bottom panel’s report estimates of the economic significance of
creditor  rights and individualism by presenting predicted dividend payout. The figures reported for creditor rights relate to the predicted payout amount
for  creditor rights ranging from zero to four. For individualism, the figures reported relate to the predicted payout amount ranging from an average of the
bottom two  to an average of the top two scores for individualism. The predicted payouts are calculated by evaluating all independent variable at their
sample medians, for the year 2005 and for industrial firms (i.e., firms coded as 1 using Worldscopes general industry classifications). The bottom panel
reports predicted payout ratios for each payout measure. Predicted dividends-to-asset (%) and dividends-to-sales (%) are also reported.
4.2. Multivariate regressions
Next we carry out a series of regressions to test our hypotheses. In all regressions, we  control for firm size, firm growth,
leverage, firm profitability, and growth opportunities. We  also include a measure for dividend premium which captures
investor’s appetite for dividend paying stocks.7 A priori, we expect the estimated coefficient on this variable to be positive (see
Baker and Wurgler, 2004). These variables are defined in Appendix B. All firm-level variables are sourced from Worldscope.
We first consider the relationships between creditor rights and dividend payout, and individualism and dividend payout,
respectively. We  employ dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, and payer as our payout measures, as indicated,
and include creditor rights, individualism, and firm-level controls, with time and industry dummies in all regressions. The
results from pooled ordinary least squares and logit regressions are presented in Table 5. In all regressions, the standard
errors are clustered by firm (see Petersen, 2009). The goal of Table 5 is to see if we  can replicate the findings from the previous
literature. Using creditor rights we can, using individualism, we cannot.
The first observation we make is that creditor rights matter. The estimated coefficient on creditor rights is positive and is
statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on creditor rights is negative when payer is the
dependent variable. Next, we consider individualism. Previous studies find a positive relationship between individualism
and dividend payout. In our analysis, we find the exact opposite. The estimated coefficients for individualism are negative.
We believe that this is because the majority of firms in our sample are domiciled in countries where creditor rights are weak
and the coefficients we  observe are of the sign we would expect for individualism in countries with poor creditor rights,
if our hypotheses are correct. The coefficient on individualism is negative and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that
dividend payout and the likelihood of paying a dividend is lower for firms in individualist countries. This is in contrast to
the findings of Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010) and others.8
7 Dividend premium is measured on an annual basis for each country. It is computed as the ratio of the average market-to-book ratio of dividend paying
firms  to the average market-to-book ratio of non-paying firms. The average dividend premium for each country is reported in Appendix C. They suggest
that,  all else equal, the greater appetite for dividend paying stocks is in Argentina and Mexico.
8 Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010 (2010, pp. 331)Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010Fidrmuc and Jacob, 2010 (2010, pp. 331) find a positive dividend-individualism
relationship using dividends-to-earnings, yet a negative relationship using dividends-to-cash flow. On closer inspection of their data, they conclude that
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The control variables are almost always statistically significant and of the expected sign. We follow Brockman and Unlu
2011) and include the CIFAR9 measure of country transparency (its level and square) in all regressions, and like them we
efer to this variable as “Disclosure” in all regressions.10 We  find similar to them in all regressions. The estimated coefficient
s negative for the level of disclosure and always positive on the squared disclosure term. These coefficient estimates suggest
hat the agency substitution model prevails in countries where disclosure is minimal and the agency outcome model of
ividends is observed where disclosure levels are high. The sign on our remaining control variables are in line with what we
xpect to find. The dividend amount tends to be greater when firms are large and profitable. In contrast, growth firms with
izable growth opportunities pay either little or small dividends. The collective findings for size, profitability, growth and
rowth opportunities are in line with the life-cycle model of dividends (see DeAngelo et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008;
rockman and Unlu, 2011; Bulan and Subramanian, 2009, for a review of the life-cycle model). Leverage and dividend payout
re negatively related since in firms where dividends are large, there is no requirement to employ debt in a bonding role.
inally, the coefficient estimate on the dividend premium variable is positive. With the exception of growth opportunities,
he control variables are of the same sign in the logit regressions.
The bottom rows of Table 5 shed light on the economic significance of creditor rights and individualism by outlining
he predicted dividend payout amounts. We  report the predicted payout as creditor rights changes from zero to four. For
ndividualism, the predicted payouts are calculated by allowing individualism to change from an average of the bottom two
ndividualism scores to an average of the top two  scores. We  adopt this approach because few countries score the same
n terms of individualism, and as a consequence we  do not want our predicted payouts to correspond to any one single
ountry. The predicted payouts are calculated by evaluating all independent variables at their sample medians, for the year
005 and for industrial firms. All else equal, as creditor rights increases from zero to four, dividends as a percentage of cash
ow increases from 7.3% to 13%. In relative terms this amounts to a 78% increase in the dividend amount.
A min-to-max change in individualism results in a fall in dividends-to-cash flow from 12.3% to 8.4%, or a relative change
n payout of almost 32%. Alternatively, a max-to-min change in individualism results in a 46.4% increase in dividend payout
n relative terms. This is in stark contrast to the predicted payouts outlined by Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010, pp. 327). They
how that “high individualism results in dividend-to-earnings ratios that are on average 18% higher compared to collectivist
ountries”.
We also present estimates of the predicted payouts using dividends-to-assets (%) and dividends-to-sales (%) so that we
an make comparisons between our findings and the findings of others. Brockman and Unlu (2009) show that dividends-to-
ales (%) changes from 0.78% to 1.98% (or a 2.5 fold increase) given a worst-to-best change in creditor rights. We  document a
hange in dividends-to-sales (%) from 0.42% to 1.28%, or a 3.05 fold increase resulting from the same change in creditor rights.
ll in all, these estimates suggest that creditor rights and individualism exert both a sizable statistical and economically
ignificant effect on the size and likelihood of corporate dividend payouts. The predicted payouts suggest that corporate
ividend payouts are most sensitive to changes in creditor rights than they are to individualism.
We now explore our hypotheses further. To do so we run two separate regressions. First, we  divide our sample into indi-
idualist and collectivist regimes and explore the dividend-creditor rights in each regime. If our hypotheses are correct, then
 priori, we would expect to find that dividend payout is positively related to the strength of creditor rights in individualist
ultures. The relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights in collectivist societies is ambiguous. Our findings
rom these set of tests are presented in Panel A of Table 6.
Our second test approach involves dividing our sample into strong and weak creditor rights sub-samples, and estimate
ividend payout-individualism regressions in each creditor rights regime. A priori, we expect to find a positive relationship
etween dividend payout and individualism under strong creditor rights alone. Where creditor rights are weak, the nature
f the relationship is much less obvious, and thus ambiguous. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. Byrne and
’Connor (2012) and Shao et al. (2013) adopt similar empirical approaches.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, the coefficient estimate for creditor rights is positive (0.051*** employing dividends-to-cash
ow) in individualist countries and is statistically significant. It is also positive and statistically significant for collectivist
ountries, yet it is much lower (0.010*** using dividends-to-cash flows), and is thus in line with our prior expectations.
he difference in the slope coefficients on the creditor rights variable is largely supportive of hypothesis 1. In individualist
ocieties, creditors demand lower dividends where creditor rights are weak, but tolerate larger dividend payouts where
heir legal rights are strong. In collectivist traditions, dividend payouts are broadly similar across the creditor right spectrum.
he relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights is much flatter in collectivist regimes. Using dividends-to-
arnings and payer, we again find support in favour of hypotheses 1, since it is only in individualist cultures that we observe a
ignificantly positive relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights. Interestingly, in countries where collectivism
he negative dividend-individualism relationship using dividends-to-cash flow is “driven by observations of relatively high dividend-to-cash flow ratios for
he  lowest quartile of individualism scores in our sample” and the relationship is positive from the second to fourth quartiles of individualism. We  explore
ur  data in the same manner and do not believe that our findings are governed by (abnormally) large dividend payouts in collectivist regimes.
9 The index is created by examining and rating companies’ annual reports for their inclusion and exclusion of 85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with
00  as the highest standard.
10 In a set of robustness tests which follow (see Tables 7 and 8), we show that our findings remain qualitatively the same when we use the revised anti-
irector rights measure in place of disclosure. Also, our conclusions remain unchanged when we  simultaneously include disclosure and the anti-director
ights index in the same regressions. This analysis is available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Table 6
Regression based tests of hypothesis 1 and 2.
Panel A: Hypothesis 1 “Dividend payout-creditor rights” regressions in individualist (high individualism) and collectivist (low individualism) traditions
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings Payer
Individualism Collectivism Individualism Collectivism Individualism Collectivism
Creditor rights 0.051*** (18.01) 0.010*** (3.28) 0.074*** (19.23) −0.013*** (5.41) 0.016*** (12.23) −0.114*** (19.14)
Controls, industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
#  Observations 67,124 57,725 67,124 57,725 67,124 57,725
R-Squared 0.236 0.140 0.261 0.110 0.464 0.403
Creditor rights range 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4 0 to 4
Predicted payout by creditor rights 5.4–25.9 11.3–13.2 10.3–40.4 26.3–21.1 0.33–0.89 0.90–0.55
Predicted dividend-to-assets (%) 0.8–2.8 0.5–1.3
Predicted dividend-to-sales (%) 0.7–2.1 0.4–1.1
Panel B: Hypothesis 2 “Dividend payout-individualism” regressions in strong (high creditor rights) and weak creditor rights (low creditor rights) countries
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends-to-earnings Payer
Strong Creditor
rights
Weak Creditor
rights
Strong Creditor
rights
Weak Creditor
rights
Strong Creditor
rights
Weak Creditor
rights
Individualism 0.001* (1.81) −0.002*** (21.28) 0.013* (1.72) −0.004*** (25.93) −0.002*** (4.46) −0.004*** (19.22)
Controls, industry and time dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included
#  Observations 39,194 85,655 39,194 85,655 39,194 85,655
R-Squared 0.192 0.179 0.189 0.224 0.444 0.451
Individualism range 18–90 20–91 18 to 90 20–91 18–90 20–91
Predicted payout by individualism 12.3–13.2 20.4–5.1 24.0–25.4 37.7–8.7 0.81–0.63 0.92–0.28
Predicted dividend-to-assets (%) 0.9–1.1 1.9–0.4
Predicted dividend-to-sales (%) 1.3–1.4 1.6–0.4
This table reports coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares and logit regressions with t-stats adjusted for clustering at the firm level presented
underneath in parenthesis. The sample period is 1996–2007. The dependent variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-earnings, or payer, as indicated.
The  top panel presents coefficient estimates from separate regressions estimated by level of individualism. The bottom panel presents coefficient estimates
from  separate regressions estimated by strength of creditor rights. A full set of controls, year and industry fixed effects are included but not reported, and
***,  **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The bottom rows of each panel reports estimates of the economic
significance of creditor rights and individualism. The figures reported for creditor rights relate to the predicted payout amount for creditor rights ranging
from  zero to four. For individualism, the figures reported relate to the predicted payout amount ranging from an average of the bottom two to an average
of  the top two  scores for individualism. The predicted payouts are calculated by evaluating all independent variable at their sample medians, for the year
2005  and for industrial firms. Predicted dividends-to-asset (%) and dividends-to-sales (%) are also reported.
prevails, the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights, and dividend payer and creditor rights, is negative.
These findings serve to remove the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights in
collectivist countries which we stated earlier in developing hypotheses 1.
The middle rows of Table 6 explore whether our findings have economic as well as statistical significance. Our in-sample
dividend payout predictions suggest that they do. For example, in individualist cultures, dividends-to-cash flow is restricted
to just 5.4% for the median firm where creditor rights is zero, yet is 11.3% in collectivist cultures where creditor rights is just
as low. Where creditor rights are strong, dividends paid are much larger in individualist cultures.
The bottom rows of Table 6 test hypothesis 2, which predicts that dividend payouts are positively related to individualism
when creditor rights are strong. Using the dividend amount (dividends relative to cash flow, earnings, assets, and sales, as
indicated), we always find a positive estimated coefficient for individualism under strong creditor rights. This finding suggests
that in individualist societies where ties between individuals are loose and agency conflict more severe, dividend payouts
are large. Where creditor rights are strong, these large dividend payouts are maintained. In contrast, where creditor rights
are weak, creditors place large restrictions on dividend payouts. When creditor protection is weak, the estimated coefficient
on individualism is negative and statistically significant.
*Once again we can attach both economic and statistical significance to our findings. A worst-to-best change in individu-
alism results in a change in dividends-to-cash flow from 12.3 to 13.2% under strong creditor rights, yet a decrease from 20.4
to 5.1% under weak creditor rights. Where creditor rights are weak, creditors place large restrictions on dividend payout in
individualist, but not in collectivist, traditions. Tests of hypothesis 2 using payer are reported in the furthest right column of
Table 6. Using payer the estimated coefficient for individualism is negative (−0.002***) under strong creditor rights, and not
positive as expected. However, under weak creditor rights, the estimated coefficient for individualism is negative and larger
(−0.004***), which together with the estimated coefficient under strong creditor rights, lends support the main premise of
hypothesis 2. That is, under weak creditor rights, the dividend amount is smaller and the likelihood of paying a dividend is
much lower in individualist traditions.In Tables 7 and 8 we assess the robustness of our findings. In each table we  perform the following tests. First, a potential
concern with our findings is that they may  be driven by an omitted country- or firm-level variable(s) correlated with creditor
rights, individualism and dividend payout. To address this concern we include a number of additional country-level variables
and a single firm-level variable identified in other studies to influence corporate dividend payouts. These are dividend tax
J. Byrne, T. O’Connor / J. of Multi. Fin. Manag. 39 (2017) 60–77 71
Table  7
Hypothesis 1: robustness tests.
Hypothesis 1
“Dividend payout-creditor rights” regressions in individualist (high individualism) and collectivist (low individualism) traditions
Dividends-to-cash flow Payer
Panel A. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights including different country- and firm-level control variables
Control variables added Individualism Collectivism Individualism Collectivism
Dividend tax advantage (DTA) 0.047*** (16.06) −0.011*** (5.88) 0.017*** (11.67) −0.104*** (13.97)
Labour  rights 0.047*** (12.55) 0.005** (2.21) 0.011*** (9.55) −0.109*** (14.39)
Stock  market development 0.046*** (16.71) −0.001 (0.37) 0.015*** (11.68) −0.102*** (14.44)
All  of the above included 0.026*** (7.03) 0.000 (1.20) 0.010*** (6.10) −0.024** (1.96)
Cash*  0.053*** (17.70) 0.010*** (5.33) 0.021*** (11.55) −0.106*** (15.96)
Panel  B. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using dividends-to-assets
Creditor rights 0.010*** (14.13) 0.002*** (11.39) n/a n/a
Panel  C. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using larger sample
Creditor rights 0.023*** (17.38) 0.011*** (6.48) 0.061*** (15.01) −0.043*** (5.39)
Panel  D. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using regression weights
Creditor rights 0.041*** (10.62) 0.010*** (2.77) 0.086*** (9.50) −0.018* (1.70)
Panel  E. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights excluding firms from Japan, UK, and the US
Creditor rights 0.035*** (10.67) 0.002 (0.55) 0.060*** (8.23) −0.077*** (5.43)
Panel  F. Coefficient estimates for creditor rights using Tobit estimation
Creditor rights 0.029*** (51.50) −0.002*** (3.77) n/a n/a
*When we  include cash as a control variable, the sample sizes in individualist and collectivist regimes are 45,283 and 44,188, respectively.
This  table reports coefficient estimates for creditor rights in a series of ordinary least squares, logit and tobit regressions. Separate regressions are estimated
by  cultural tradition (individualism and collectivism). The dependent variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-assets, and payer, as indicated. Panel
A  includes a number of additional country- and firm-level determinants of dividend payout not included previously. Panel B uses dividends-to-assets. The
sample  period is 1996–2007. Panel C employs a larger sample of firms over a longer time period. The larger sample includes firms from Brazil, Chile, Greece,
Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, and Taiwan and the sample period extends from 1981 to 2007. In this larger sample,
the  country median individualism is 51. Panels D and E address concerns that our findings are driven either by unequal number of observations across
countries. In Panel D we  estimate weighted least squares regressions where the weight of each observation is the inverse of the number of observations in
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rach  country, so that each country receives an equal weighting. In Panel E, firms from Japan, the UK and the US are excluded. Panel F presents coefficient
stimates from tobit regressions. A full-set of firm and country controls, industry and time fixed effects are included, but not reported. All variables are
efined in the main text, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
dvantage, labour rights, stock market development, and corporate cash holdings. Dividend tax advantage (DTA) measures
he after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in capital gains.
TA is sourced from Bartram et al. (2012) and Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010). The relationship between dividend payout and DTA
as consistently been shown in previous studies to be positive. Yu (2010) finds a negative robust relationship between labor
ights and dividend payouts. We  source labour rights data from Botero et al. (2004). Twu  (2012) shows that stock market
evelopment can explain part of the decline in the number of firms that pay dividends in recent times. We  include a measure
f stock market development (stock market capitalization to GDP), which we source from an updated version of Beck et al.
2001). Finally, we include corporate cash balances as an additional firm-level control variable in all regressions. Presumably,
ature firms with large cash balances, pay large dividends. Cash is calculated as cash to book assets and is sourced from
orldscope.11 The first five rows in Panel A of Tables 7 and 8 report the coefficient estimates for creditor rights (Table 7) and
ndividualism (Table 8) after adding DTA, labor rights, stock market development, all three country-level variables together,
nd cash to our baseline regressions reported in Panels A and B of Table 6.
In panel B we report the estimated coefficients for creditor rights (Table 7) and individualism (Table 8) when we use
ividends-to-assets in place of dividends-to-cash flow and dividends-to-earnings. In panel C we address concerns that our
ndings may  not be universal but specific to the sample of firms we  use and the period we  cover. To address these concerns,
e extend our sample to span the years from 1981 to 2007, and include firms from countries with mandatory dividends and
rms we previously eliminated because a disclosure score was not available for their country. The extended sample now
ncludes firms from Brazil, Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, and Taiwan,
hich increases the number of countries from 28 to 39. This sample covers the period from 1981 to 2007 and results in a total
f 186,833 firm-year observations.12 Appendix D outlines the sample size, dividend payout, creditor rights and individualism
or each of these countries. Dividends-to-cash flow ranges from 0 to 0.19, and creditor rights and individualism from 0 to
, and 11–65, respectively. Where the larger and extended sample of firms is employed, country-level shareholder rights,
easured using the revised anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) is included in place of disclosure.13 Next
11 The inclusion of cash reduces our sample size to 89,471 firm-year observations.
12 In the extended and larger sample, median creditor rights remains at 2. Median individualism is 51.
13 The values of DTA, labor rights, stock market development, revised anti-director rights, and financial architecture are presented for each country in
ppendix C. In an additional set of (unreported) robustness tests, we find that our findings are unaffected when we simultaneously include disclosure and
evised anti-director rights in the same regressions.
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Table 8
Hypothesis 2: robustness tests.
Hypothesis 2
“Dividend payout-individualism” regressions in strong (high creditor rights) and weak creditor rights (low creditor rights) countries
Dividends-to-cash flow Payer
Panel A. Coefficient estimates for individualism including different country- and firm-level control variables
Control variables added Strong Creditor
rights regime
Weak Creditor
rights regime
Strong Creditor
rights regime
Weak Creditor
rights regime
Dividend tax advantage (DTA) 0.001*** (3.01) −0.002*** (20.77) −0.002*** (3.63) −0.005*** (21.47)
Labour  rights 0.001* (1.94) −0.002*** (16.47) −0.002*** (3.83) −0.004*** (16.65)
Stock  market development 0.001 (1.75)* −0.002*** (20.36) −0.002*** (4.20) −0.004*** (19.25)
All  of the above included 0.004* (1.76) −0.002*** (15.69) −0.002*** (3.85) −0.004*** (16.86)
Cash*  0.001* (1.73) −0.002*** (19.97) −0.002*** (3.97) −0.006*** (18.34)
Panel  B. Coefficient estimates for individualism using dividends-to-assets
Individualism 0.001* (1.82) −0.0003*** (14.18) n/a n/a
Panel  C. Coefficient estimates for individualism using larger sample
Individualism 0.001*** (7.26) −0.001*** (24.95) −0.001*** (4.91) −0.010*** (40.84)
Panel  D. Coefficient estimates for individualism using regression weights
Individualism 0.001*** (5.43) −0.002*** (10.79) −0.001*** (3.44) −0.002*** (3.73)
Panel  E. Coefficient estimates for individualism excluding firms from Japan, UK, and the US
Individualism 0.001* (1.68) −0.002*** (13.47) −0.002*** (3.96) −0.004*** (7.34)
Panel  F. Coefficient estimates for individualism excluding countries with creditor rights equal to two
Individualism 0.001 (0.61) −0.002*** (5.95) −0.002*** (4.46) −0.004*** (9.21)
Panel  G. Coefficient estimates for individualism using Tobit estimation
Individualism 0.004*** (6.96) −0.002*** (97.04) n/a n/a
*When we include cash as a control variable, the sample sizes in strong and weak creditor rights regimes are 35,902 and 53,569, respectively.
This  table reports coefficient estimates for individualism in a series of regressions. Separate regressions are estimated by strength of creditor rights. The
dependent variable is dividends-to-cash flow, dividends-to-assets, and payer, as indicated. Panel A includes a number of additional country- and firm-level
determinants of dividend payout not included previously. Panel B uses dividends-to-assets. The sample period is 1996–2007. Panel C employs a larger
sample  of firms over a longer time period. The larger sample includes firms from Brazil, Chile, Greece, Indonesia, Israel, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
South  Africa, and Taiwan and the sample period extends from 1981 to 2007. Panels D and E address concerns that our findings are driven either by unequal
number of observations across countries. In Panel D we estimate weighted least squares regressions where the weight of each observation is the inverse of
the  number of observations in each country, so that each country receives an equal weighting. In Panel E, firms from Japan, the UK and the US are excluded.
Panel  F excludes countries with a creditor rights score of 2. Panel G presents coefficient estimates from tobit regressions. A full-set of firm and country
controls, industry and time fixed effects are included, but not reported. All variables are defined in the main text, and ***, **, and * denotes significance at
the  1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
we address concerns that our findings are unduly influenced by sample-bias created by the large number of firms in the U.S.,
the U.K., and Japan. We  address this concern in two-ways. First, we  estimate a series of weighted least squares regressions
where the weight of each observation is the inverse of the number of observations in each country so that each country
receives an equal-weighting. We  also test hypotheses 1 and 2 without firms from the U.S., the U.K., and Japan. In Table 8 we
address a concern that our tests of hypothesis 2 are influenced by how we  differentiate between strong and weak creditor
rights. While it is reasonable to assume that creditor protection is weak given scores of 0 and 1, and strong given scores
of 3 and 4, a creditor rights score of 2 is at the margin. In these tests we  exclude countries with a creditor rights score of
2. Finally, in the last panel of Tables 7 and 8, we estimate Tobit models to account for the censored nature of our dividend
payout ratios (censored at zero).
In summary we find that our findings are qualitatively unaffected given the battery of tests we perform in Tables 7 and 8.
The dividend-creditor rights relationship is positive in individualist traditions, while much smaller and often negative in
collectivist traditions. The dividend-individualism relation is positive under strong creditor rights and negative under weak
creditor rights.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we exploit cross-country variation in creditor rights and culture, proxied using individualism, and explore
how they interact with each other to influence corporate dividend policy. Our findings support the contention of, among
others, Aggarwal and Goodell (2014), who argue that ignoring the impact of national culture in finance research is not
an optimal strategy and that there is plenty of scope for strengthening finance research by incorporating the impact of
cultural dimensions. Previous studies which explore how the agency costs of debt together with the agency costs of equity
influence corporate dividend policy have failed to acknowledge the role national culture might play. Our findings suggest
that creditors influence over corporate payout policy is determined not only by the strength of creditor rights but also by
culture. Where creditor rights are strong, creditors accept the status quo, that is, large dividends in individualist traditions,
and small dividend payouts in collectivist cultures. The interaction of creditor rights and culture arises when creditor rights
are weak. In individualist traditions, where agency costs of debt are high according to the law and culture, creditors place
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arge restrictions on dividend payouts. In contrast where agency costs of debt are high as implied by weak creditor rights,
et low according to culture, creditors place few if any restrictions on dividend payouts. In this instance culture overrides
egal rules to determine creditors influence over corporate dividend policy.
Our findings have important implications for the dividend creditor rights and dividend-individualism relations. In a
ample of 17,544 firms from 28 countries, we show that the dividend creditor rights relationship is positive in individualist
raditions yet negative in many instances in collectivist cultures. The dividend-individualism relationship is positive under
trong creditor rights yet negative under weak creditor rights. Where creditor rights are weak, creditor rights and culture
ome together to influence corporate dividend policy.
cknowledgements
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ppendix A. Median dividend payout by individualism and creditor rights regimes
This table reports the median dividend payout in countries differentiated by culture and creditor rights. Median dividend
ayout is reported for each country and the average and median of these median payouts is presented underneath. Separate
gures are also reported for weak creditor rights regimes where countries with a creditor rights score of two are excluded,
nd without firms from the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan. The median figures for the full sample are reported
n Table 4.
ypothesis 1
he relationship between dividend payout and creditor rights under individualist and collectivist cultural traditions
ndividualism and Strong Creditor rights Individualism and Weak Creditor rights
D/CF D/E Pay D/CF D/E Pay
ustralia 0.00 0.00 0.55 Belgium 0.09 0.24 0.79
enmark 0.09 0.20 0.85 Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00
etherlands 0.18 0.33 0.82 France 0.08 0.19 0.72
ew  Zealand 0.32 0.54 0.85 Ireland 0.12 0.18 0.69
nited  Kingdom 0.13 0.22 0.65 Italy 0.09 0.25 0.80
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.62
Sweden 0.10 0.19 0.61
United States 0.00 0.00 0.00
edian 0.13 0.22 0.82 Median 0.09 0.19 0.66
verage 0.14 0.26 0.74 Average 0.06 0.13 0.53
edian (excl. UK) 0.14 0.27 0.84 Median (excl. US) 0.09 0.19 0.69
Excluding countries with creditor rights score of 2
Median 0.08 0.18 0.61
Average 0.06 0.11 0.40
ypothesis 2
he relationship between dividend payout and individualism under strong and weak creditor rights
ollectivism and Strong Creditor rights Collectivism and Weak Creditor rights
D/CF D/E Pay D/CF D/E Pay
ustria 0.12 0.29 0.81 Argentina 0.00 0.00 0.70
ermany 0.00 0.00 0.59 Finland 0.22 0.41 0.87
ong  Kong 0.00 0.00 0.64 India 0.14 0.21 0.94
orea  0.04 0.11 0.79 Japan 0.09 0.22 0.92
alaysia 0.07 0.13 0.76 Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.63
ingapore 0.10 0.18 0.82 Spain 0.14 0.26 0.83
Switzerland 0.12 0.25 0.86
Thailand 0.12 0.25 0.83
Turkey 0.00 0.00 0.52
edian  0.05 0.12 0.78 Median 0.12 0.22 0.83
verage 0.06 0.12 0.74 Average 0.09 0.18 0.79Median (excl. Japan) 0.12 0.23 0.83
Excluding countries with creditor rights score of 2
Median 0.06 0.13 0.78
Average 0.09 0.17 0.77
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Appendix B. Variable descriptions
Variable Description Source Coverage
Dividends-to-cash flow Dividends per share/cash flow per share Worldscope 1996–2007
Dividends-to-earnings Dividends per share/earnings per share Worldscope 1996–2007
Dividends-to-assets Total (common) dividends to total assets Worldscope 1996–2007
Dividends-to-sales Total (common) dividends to total sales Worldscope 1996–2007
Payer  1 if the firm pays a dividend in year t, zero
otherwise
Worldscope 1996–2007
Size  Log of book assets in US$ (Log of book sales in
US$ used in div-to-assets regressions)
Worldscope 1996–2007
Growth Logarithmic one-year sales growth Worldscope 1996–2007
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxation to book
assets
Worldscope 1996–2007
Leverage Total debt to total assets Worldscope 1996–2007
Tobin’s q Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of debt
less plus market capitalization divided by the
book value of assets
Worldscope 1996–2007
Cash  Cash to book assets Worldscope 1996–2007
Creditor rights An index aggregating creditor rights, following
La Porta et al. (2000). The index ranges from 0
(weak) to 4 (strong creditor rights) and is
constructed as at January for every year from
1978 to 2003. We use creditor rights data for
the year 2002
Djankov et al. (2007) 2002
Individualism Captures the extent of individualism and
collectivism in a society. Individualism and
collectivism are defined in the main text
Hofstede (2001) Various years
Disclosure Country-level accounting disclosure score
assigned by Center for International Financial
Analysis and Research (CIFAR)
CIFAR (1995) and Hope et al.
(2007)
1993
Labour rights Employment laws index from Botero et al.
(2004). The employment laws index combines
four sub-indexes, namely (1) alternative
employment contracts, (2) cost of increasing
hours worked, (3) cost of firing workers, and
(4) dismissal procedures.
Botero et al. (2004) 1997
Stock  market development Stock market capitalization to GDP in each
year from 1996 to 2007
Beck et al. (2001) (updated) 1996–2007
Dividend tax advantage The after-tax value of one dollar paid out in
dividends divided by the after-tax value of one
dollar paid out in capital gains. Dividend tax
advantage is for 2001
Bartram et al. (2012) and
Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010)
2001
Shareholder rights Revised version of the original anti-director
rights index of La Porta et al. (2000)
Djankov et al. (2008) 1997
Dividend premium The ratio of the average market-to-book of
dividend paying firms to the average
market-to-book of non-paying firms. Dividend
premium is calculated annually for each
country
Worldscope 1996–2007
Appendix C. Country-level variables
This table reports country-level variables for our sample of countries. Dividend tax advantage variable measures the
after-tax value of one dollar paid out in dividends divided by the after-tax value of one dollar paid out in capital gains, and is
sourced from Bartram et al. (2012) and Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010). Disclosure is a country’s disclosure score assigned by the
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR, 1995). Labour rights are sourced from Botero et al. (2004).
Stock market development is stock market capitalization to GDP and is sourced from an updated version of Beck et al. (2001).
Dividend premium is computed annually for each country and is computed as the ratio of the average market-to-book of
dividend paying firms to the average market-to-book of non-paying firms. Shareholder rights are the revised anti-director
rights index of Djankov et al. (2008).
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Dividend tax
advantage (DTA)
Disclosure Labour rights Stock market dev Dividend premium Shareholder rights
(Revised ADR Index)
rgentina 1.0000 68 0.3442 38.58 1.24 2
ustralia 0.8372 80 0.3515 110.06 0.95 4
ustria  0.7500 62 0.5007 23.30 0.79 2.5
elgium 0.8500 68 0.5133 68.27 0.95 3.0
anada  0.7905 75 0.2615 107.40 0.81 4
enmark 0.6387 75 0.5727 57.90 0.90 4
inland 1.0782 83 0.7366 130.08 1.06 3.5
rance  0.6569 78 0.7443 79.47 0.99 3.5
ermany 0.7276 67 0.7015 47.11 1.07 3.5
ong  Kong 1.0000 73 0.1696 339.12 0.83 5
ndia  0.7435 61 0.4434 47.40 1.49 5
reland  0.6105 81 0.3427 59.74 0.75 5
taly  0.8726 66 0.6499 44.62 1.07 2
apan  0.5797 71 0.1639 78.06 0.92 4.5
orea  0.6895 68 0.4457 55.46 0.82 4.5
alaysia 1.0000 79 0.1885 141.56 0.96 5
exico 1.0000 71 0.5943 23.41 1.24 3
etherlands 0.7000 74 0.7256 113.96 0.82 2.5
ew  Zealand 1.0088 80 0.1607 39.54 1.07 4
orway 1.0753 75 0.6853 44.73 0.89 3.5
ingapore 0.9713 79 0.3116 185.63 0.94 5
pain  0.8509 72 0.7447 71.37 0.94 5
weden 0.7568 83 0.7405 104.83 0.87 3.5
witzerland 0.5850 80 0.4520 229.64 1.04 3
hailand 1.0286 66 0.4097 51.56 0.99 4
urkey  0.6168 58 0.4026 22.40 1.13 3
td  Kingdom 0.8571 85 0.2824 141.99 0.82 5
nited  States 0.7033 76 0.2176 135.07 0.85 3
ppendix D. Countries included in extended sample
Panel A reports summary statistics for firms from countries not included in the original sample. # Obs is the number of
rm-year observations, and # Firms, the number of firms in each country. Median dividend payout is reported for each coun-
ry. Dividend payout is dividends-to-cash flow (Div/CF), dividends-to-earnings (Div/E), as indicated. Payer is the proportion
f firms in each country which pay a dividend. Payer is first calculated on a yearly basis from 1981 to 2007, and I report the
edian payer for each country over this time interval. Creditor rights are from Djankov et al. (2007) and correspond to values
n 2002. Individualism is from Hofstede (2001). Panel B outlines the number of firm-years (#Obs) and firms for each country
n the original sample of firms examined over the extended sample period. Dividend payout data is from Worldscope.
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Panel A
Sample Dividend payout measures Creditor rights Individualism
# Obs # Firms Div/CF Div/E Payer
Brazil 1572 209 0.03 0.19 0.56 1 38
Chile  951 119 0.19 0.34 0.75 2 23
Greece 1771 238 0.16 0.34 0.68 1 35
Indonesia 2059 250 0.00 0.00 0.33 2 14
Israel  511 92 0.00 0.00 0.30 3 54
Pakistan 937 93 0.12 0.22 0.60 1 14
Peru  379 55 0.00 0.00 0.43 0 11
Philippines 921 118 0.00 0.00 0.33 1 32
Portugal 548 58 0.05 0.19 0.54 1 27
South  Africa 2341 267 0.15 0.25 0.59 3 65
Taiwan 6479 1121 0.10 0.19 0.62 2 17
18,469 2620
Panel B
Number of firm-years and firms for original country sample over extend sample period
# Obs # Firms # Obs # Firms
Argentina 413 51 Korea 5749 789
Australia 5038 788 Malaysia 6067 806
Austria  651 60 Mexico 892 100
Belgium 1008 90 Netherlands 1923 146
Canada 6828 860 New Zealand 593 73
Denmark 1396 120 Norway 1164 132
Finland 1214 114 Singapore 3584 516
France  6671 647 Spain 1192 104
Germany 6342 662 Sweden 2382 275
Hong  Kong 5448 739 Switzerland 2218 183
India  3804 509 Thailand 2873 347
Ireland 643 49 Turkey 1078 171
Italy  1815 181 United Kingdom 14,113 1388
Japan  34,059 3374 United States 49,206 4832
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